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**CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTION FOR MILITARY  
PERSONNEL CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS**

**Elton J. Delaune, Jr., et al**

**Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**15 February 1972**

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USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTION FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL  
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Group Study Project - Group Research Report

By

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15 February 1972

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This paper examines the historical precedents for, the problems encountered and the results achieved by the Department of the Army in executing the 1965-68 civilianization program. Conclusions are drawn as to the applicability of like programs being undertaken in the 1970's. Research efforts consisted of examining files of the manpower management staff agencies in the Department of Defense and the services, Congressional records, two studies by former students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and an official Army historical account of previous civilianization efforts. The paper concludes that: civilians do perform effectively in non-combat service/support type functions; civilians, in the long run, are less expensive to employ than military personnel; the Congress and Department of Defense stress total force manpower management; and, the fiscal realities of restrained defense budgets dictate the need for accomplishing manpower tasks in the most effective yet efficient manner. The paper summarizes that the Army should: continue to identify positions that can be occupied by civilians and employ civilians in those jobs where possible; take advantage of any opportunity to civilianize more jobs if the Army reduces its overseas basing in the 1970's; make civilianization an integral portion of any plan for expansion or mobilization.

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## PREFACE

This research paper is designed to support a US Army War College study effort, Army Tasks of the Seventies. No restraints were placed on the authors with regard to current doctrine or regulations in outlining the scope, methodology or analysis. The authors were encouraged to make maximum use of completed studies on the subject rather than basic research.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

A nation's geography, natural resources, technology, and the socio-political structure all have important bearing on its growth and vitality.<sup>1</sup> One factor remains constant as the keystone for all the rest. As stated by President John F. Kennedy in 1963: "Manpower is the basic resource. It is the indispensable means of converting other resources to mankind's use and benefit."<sup>2</sup>

A nation that fails to utilize its manpower effectively cannot hope to maintain its viability. Conversely, the nation that takes positive action to ensure that its manpower resources are used effectively has taken a giant step towards achieving growth and power. On the national level the management of manpower involves numerous complex problems. The Federal Government, in addition to being concerned with the nation's manpower in its entirety, is at the same time, the country's largest single employer. In the later role the government faces problems in manpower management, the solution of which has marked effect on the effective use of national manpower resources.

Within the Federal Government, the Department of Defense is clearly the largest single organization in the United States -- governmental or industrial. The largest industrial enterprise in the United States, General Motors Corporation, is a dwarf in



comparison. General Motors' projected sales in 1971 were expected to exceed \$20.0 billion with average employment exceeding 700 thousand workers. The Defense Department, on the other hand, projected for FY 1972 a budget of \$77.1 billion (FY 72 column of FY 73 Defense Budget) and a full-time military and civilian work force of approximately 3 million 587 thousand.<sup>4</sup> Such operations, and the resources required to support them, challenge the imagination, skill, and abilities of the most adept managers. The mission of the Defense Department is to carry out national security programs that satisfy the best interest of the country. The administration and management of the resources available must also reflect the best interest of the national posture.

This discussion is only a means of emphasizing to the reader that the Department of Defense not only recognizes its role as the largest operating organization, but also its greater responsibility to effectively utilize its vast resources.

The effectiveness of the defense management effort may be partially measured by the fact that, excluding Vietnam costs, the defense needs have actually been receiving a declining percentage of the Gross National Product and the Federal Budget. The following chart depicting the financial summary of the Department of Defense Budget from FY 68 to FY 73 shows the decline.

TABLE I

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET

FINANCIAL SUMMARY<sup>5</sup>

(BILLIONS OF CURRENT \$)

	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>	<u>FY 1973</u>
<u>Budget Authority</u>	<u>\$ 76.4</u>	<u>\$ 72.9</u>	<u>\$ 77.1</u>	<u>\$ 83.4</u>
(Pay Increases Included)				(4.1)
% of Federal Budget (Authority)	39.1%	29.9%	29.9%	29.8%
<u>Outlays</u>	<u>\$ 78.0</u>	<u>\$ 75.5</u>	<u>\$ 75.8</u>	<u>\$ 76.5</u>
% of Federal Budget (Outlays)	42.5%	34.5%	31.0%	30.0%
% of Gross National Product	9.4%	7.5%	7.0%	6.4%

When one considers the relatively inflexible cost growth of Federal social programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and income security, there is an increasing awareness that Defense spending affords the administration the greatest single area to adjust the total Federal Budget. Additionally, the manpower costs portion of the Defense Budget have been increasing due to salary increases. For example, applying all pay raises received from 1 July 1963 through 31 January 1972 to the 1964 manpower program (non Southeast Asia), military personnel have received eleven pay raises totalling \$11.1 billion; civilian personnel have received ten, totalling \$5.1 billion; and, retired personnel have received eight, totalling \$3.7

billion for a grand total of \$19.9 billion. Faced with these facts, the importance of manpower management becomes self-evident.

The defense department has three sources of manpower to utilize in discharging its assigned responsibilities: military personnel, civil service employees, and contractual services. Of the three sources, the military and civilian personnel combined are considered an "in-house" capability; contractal services are external, but complementary. From the standpoint of overall management effectiveness there must be a "mix" or "balance" of the three elements. Each has its own advantage in providing skills and specialized knowledge in the attainment of the total defense mission. Inherent in this utilization is that the service by a military person, volunteer or draftee, constitutes an obligation for the military establishment to utilize this resource for authentic military purposes -- not to staff activities that could be adequately staffed by civilian personnel or handled by contractual services.

In recent years the matter of the military-civilian mix has received increasing attention. This culminated in a major defense program, the Civilianization Program, which was instituted in 1965. Its purpose was to review functions being performed by military personnel to determine whether their assignment was necessary to meet a military requirement or whether the functions could be performed by other than military personnel or eliminated.<sup>7</sup> Since the program was the largest of its kind ever undertaken, an analysis

and appraisal of the effort will be the primary purpose of this research paper.

#### SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The fundamental purpose of this research effort is to determine whether the DOD Civilian Substitutability Program (Army term: Civilianization Program) has achieved its desired results and to determine if such a program will be applicable for the Army during the 1970's. Before being able to make such a determination, the writers believe it is necessary to examine: (1) the historical and evolutionary events that took place in previous years and led to the decision to implement the program; (2) the Congressional interests in the Defense manpower program; and, (3) more definite details of what the 1965-1968 program included, the problems encountered and what the program was to accomplish from a manpower management viewpoint. Based on this knowledge, conclusions will be drawn as to the applicability of like programs during the 1970's.

#### SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Very little has been written on the subject per se. The Department of the Army compiled an historical study encompassing the Army's Military-Civilian worker relationships and substitutability programs from colonial days to 1964.<sup>8</sup> While the study adequately explains the events that took place, very little analysis of the long-range effects of the program are included. Other than this study, data had to be obtained by reviewing the remaining file data

in the Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) and the Manpower offices of the services. Additionally, two case studies on the 1965-1968 Civilianization Program were completed by former students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Mr Walter S. Downs, GS-14, USAF, Class of 1968, and Colonel John J. Betz, Jr. USA, Class of 1968. Completion of their studies in this time frame allowed access to complete and current files in the Pentagon. Therefore, the writers relied heavily on these studies for the analysis of the planning and implementation of the 1965-1968 program. Brief discussions were also held with representatives of the various manpower offices who, for the most part, were not the primary action officers during the 1965-1968 program.

## CHAPTER I

### FOOTNOTES

1. A.F.K. Organiski, World Politics, (1965), p. 116.
2. US Department of Labor, Manpower Report to the President: Manpower Requirements, Resources, Utilization and Training, (1963).
3. Standard and Poor's, Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives, (1971), p. 749.
4. Melvin R. Laird, Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972-1976 Defense Program and the FY 1972 Defense Budget, (1971), p. 187-9.
5. Robert C. Moot, Lecture to the US Army War College Class of 1972, (28 January 1972).
6. Ibid.
7. Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, (1 August 1965).
8. US Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, History of Military-Civilian Substitutability in the Army, (October 1965).

## CHAPTER II

### EVOLUTION OF THE SUBSTITUTABILITY PROGRAMS AND DEFENSE MANPOWER UTILIZATION POLICIES

#### GENERAL

The antecedents to the present day concept of substitutability can be traced back to the colonial period. This would appear to be an obvious fact since the United States has, throughout its history, placed a traditional reliance on the citizen-soldier. A natural and high degree of substitutability both between civilians and military, and military and civilians was therefore, a built-in feature of the American military system. The volumes of published military history are full of examples of this interchangeability. Prior to the implementation of the 1965 Civilianization Program, the Department of Army, under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and the Office, Chief of Military History (OCMH), compiled a history describing the use of civilians in terms of types of functions, and duties they have performed at various periods of history in relation to the nature, mission and function of the Army during such periods. The purpose of this chapter is to present, in abbreviated form, the antecedents to and the present day policy for manpower management. The official study was used as the primary source document for the historical portion of this chapter.<sup>1</sup>

## REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Civilians occupied staff positions throughout the war although officers generally were heads of the staff agencies. Civilians were used extensively in the engineer and logistical support and service functions to include acting as drivers for the artillery horses. The greatest problems arose from the lack of control and discipline that could be exercised with civilians. Terms of service ran from one year to day-to-day jobbing and were not enforceable by military law. The Quartermaster General attempted to form a logistical support organization, but with little success. Even the soldiers of that era considered non-line work degrading.<sup>2</sup>

## WAR OF 1812

At the end of the Revolutionary War the staff and support control agencies virtually disappeared from the Army. The westward frontier push reestablished the Army on a small scale, but no permanent support structure was created. In fact, from 1798 to 1812, supply of the Army was wholly a civilian function. Congress charged the Secretary of War with the duties of Quartermaster General, Commissary General, Master of Ordnance, Indian Commissions, and Commissioner of Public Lands. There were only eight civilian clerks in the War Department when the war started. During the war, a Quartermaster General (QMG) was appointed and the number of QM officers increased, but the Secretary of War



still controlled the QMG functions. In the field, the operation was in many ways similar to the Revolutionary War except that soldiers replaced civilians as drivers for the artillery horses. Contractural transportation was used in the rear supply lines.

The generally poor performance of the Army during the war led to a major reorganization of the Army under the auspices of Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun. Secretary Calhoun established the technical bureaus under the direction of military officers. Much of the field labor was still accomplished by civilians, but completely under military control. Contractural supply and transportation by civilian companies was stopped. While the reorganization appears to have been a militarization of the supply and service support, very little was done to organize service troop organizations.<sup>3</sup>

#### MEXICAN WAR

The Mexican War was the first time the Army had to support overseas type operations. The strength of the Army was such that troops could not be diverted from line to logistical functions. Since the Calhoun reorganization did not provide for supply and service organizations, this effort had to be accomplished by hiring the transportation, mechanics, teamsters and laborers needed. By the time Mexico City fell, there were over 5,000 civilians with General Winfield Scott's Army of 27,000.<sup>4</sup>

## CIVIL WAR

From the beginning to the end of the Civil War the Army increased in size from over 16,000 to over 1,000,000 men. This vast increase in manpower, coupled with the great geographic expanse of the war required the hiring of large numbers of civilians. The requirements for and the functions of the civilians remained basically the same as in previous wars. By 1864, all railroads and the military telegraph were under civilian control. At one time, the military established a Field Service Telegraph system operated and maintained by military personnel. Conflicts of interest developed and the decision was in favor of all telegraph services being controlled by civilians. Throughout the war, very little effort was expended to organize a body of service troops who could replace most of the civilians.<sup>5</sup>

## SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The mistakes of the Army in this time period were no different than at the beginning of the Civil War. The campaign of only 110 days was over before the obvious deficiencies in planning, organization, and operation could be remedied. Subsequent to the war, more organizational changes were made. The Army General Staff was introduced in 1903. The Surgeon General was given authority to, in emergencies, hire as many surgeons as necessary. Congressional interest in the support problems resulted in an act being passed on 24 August 1912, that consolidated the former Quartermaster

General, Commissary and Pay Departments. Additionally, this act established a service corps, not to exceed 6,000 enlisted men, to do the work of clerks, engineers, firemen, carpenters, blacksmiths, packers, teamsters, and laborers. The Quartermaster Corps gradually built up this service corps and proudly proclaimed on 30 June 1913, that 1,594 civilians and 2,045 detailed line soldiers had been replaced by 2, 816 qualified enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps.<sup>6</sup>

#### WORLD WAR I

Two of the greatest problems of the war were getting the troops to France and the in-country labor needs of the American Expeditionary Forces. The Army owned ships which were manned by civilian crews plus civilian chartered ships were utilized to transport troops to France. The labor problem was so acute that the complete responsibility for running the ships was turned over to the Navy in the summer of 1917. To preclude diverting combat soldiers to labor tasks, a Labor Bureau was established in France to hire local nationals. By the end of October 1918, over 47,000 civilian workers, nearly all local nationals, were with the Army in France.<sup>7</sup>

## WORLD WAR II

The very nature of the war mobilization requirements and the method with which it was accomplished precluded a deliberate program of civilian substitutability for military personnel. The distinction in times of mobilization becomes less important. There were many reasons for this. For example, civilians were hired or commissioned for jobs requiring specialized skills. Many incumbent civilians continued to work at the same job and location, but were in uniform. The Women's Army Corps was created and for the most part accomplished tasks that would have been done by civilians. The priority requirements of certain private industries reduced the availability of civilian personnel that could be hired by the military.

The concern of the General Staff for effective manpower utilization was very evident during the war. As a matter of policy, enlisted men could not be assigned to the Army Service Forces headquarters or the Washington Offices of the Technical Services. Of about 1,000,000 civilian workers employed by the Army Service Forces, 8% were in General Administration overhead, 7% in procurement, and the bulk (85%) were in arsenals and manufacturing, supply depot and port operations, and construction. Officers and enlisted men were still used extensively for the administration operations at posts in the United States.<sup>8</sup>

This concern for manpower management in the Army and War Department resulted in one of the earliest written policy statements on civilian substitutability. War Department Circular 103, 15 April 1943 stated:

1. The War Department, as one of the greatest users of manpower, is deeply concerned with the adoption of measures which will secure its most effective and economical utilization. While the manpower pool under its jurisdiction consists of both military and civilian categories, each group constitutes an essential part in the War Department program which contemplates the use of civilians in those positions where military skills and military status are not essential.

2. Substitutions between these groups to fill positions within the limitations set forth above is a condition precedent to the attainment of our maximum war effort. Therefore economies that must be enforced upon the use of military manpower necessitate a very careful analysis of the use of military manpower within the War Department and its agencies in the field, to the end that their use in replacing military manpower is not unduly curtailed.

3. The release of general service personnel for duty with combat units is one of the primary objectives of the War Department. In carrying out that objective, the policy of the War Department is to substitute limited service military personnel, including personnel of the Women's Auxiliary Corps, for general service personnel. Replacements of military personnel by male civilians will be confined to those over draft age, or unfit for military service, and not engaged in an industry equally vital to the military or civilian effort.<sup>9</sup>

This policy was reemphasized and expanded in War Department Circular 248, which was published immediately (15 August 1945) following the surrender of Japan. In a paragraph titled, "Policy on Use of Civilians After Defeat of Japan," this circular stated:

The greatest emphasis should be placed upon the training of military personnel for purely military duties. It is, therefore, desirable to restrict such personnel to those functions only which require military skills or which for training, security, or disciplinary reasons must be performed by officers or soldiers. Subject to this restriction, the employment of civilians qualified in certain professions (such as engineers, scientists, architects, etc.) and in management functions, together with those who can perform tasks which require skilled, semiskilled labor, will not only free military personnel from nonmilitary overhead duties, but will likewise tend to provide a nucleus of trained civilians around whom can be based any expansion of activities which may become necessary over the years.<sup>10</sup>

#### POST WORLD WAR II

Other minor amendments to the World War II policies appeared in later policy statements and documents. Funding appears to have been an increasingly limiting factor as these revisions basically reaffirmed the quoted policies and added the qualification "within space and fund limitations."

Meanwhile the theme of civilian substitution was increasingly heard in Congress. The Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee stated the following in one of several reports dealing with the subject:

The military, in times of total mobilization, virtually becomes a vast economy in itself, duplicating in its organization and functions much of the normal operation of the Nation's economy. The military concerns itself with much more than the battlefields -- it necessarily becomes involved in contracting, production, transportation, housing, communication, and countless other such activities. The result is that, as the military's functions grow, the number of administrative noncombatant personnel

to sustain the operation grows in rapid progression. . . While the military now utilizes a large number of civilians, there is a tendency to resist replacing many combat-fit men with civilians in positions closely related to military functions, e.g., training instruction, housekeeping duties and clerical work on military reservations and similar establishments. This resistance prevents the most effective use of the Nation's total manpower resources.<sup>11</sup>

In line with this concept, defense-level policy on civilian substitution appeared in Department of Defense Directive 110.4, 20 August 1954, which directed the following in connection with manpower programing activities of the military services.

Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, which do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved, and which do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment.<sup>12</sup>

This statement has remained as the basic Defense-level policy.

"Operation Teammate" was undertaken during FY 1955 and extended into FY 1956. This was a deliberate Army program to carry out DOD policies to reduce the number of military personnel in support-type activities with civilians and utilize the military spaces saved to create new units within the combat force structure of the Army. Steps were taken to obtain authorization and funds for the additional civilian spaces; however, only a portion were approved. A general reduction in civilian ceilings followed that required these spaces to be absorbed within existing authorizations

by the end of FY 1956. As a further development, military strength was also revised downward, which meant that the military spaces made available had to be used to man existing units as opposed to the planned activation of desired units. "Operation Teammate" was terminated 30 September 1955, after the Army had hired a total of 9,803 civilians to replace 10,306 military. The total programmed number of 12,000 civilians was not hired due to restrictive funding, reduced civilian space ceilings, and a scarcity of certain skills in the civilian labor market.<sup>13</sup>

In 1962, the Army agreed to convert 638 military positions in Sales Commissaries and Nonappropriated Fund Activities to 620 civilian spaces. This was contingent upon an increase of 620 civilian spaces. Later, the Army was informed by OSD that the plan had been revised to provide for a conversion of 577 military positions for which an increase of 471 civilian spaces was authorized, without an increase in funds. This required the Army to absorb the cost of 471 civilian spaces and to either eliminate or absorb 106 civilian positions. In reality, this effort was the only implemented portion of a large planning program to convert 6,000 military positions to civilian occupancy, titled "Project 6." This conversion plan was developed by the Army Staff by direction of OSD and the Under Secretary of the Army. Reasons for not implementing the full plan during FY 1963 are not fully documented. However, the planned conversions, once again, involved support and service type positions that more explicitly carried out the 1954 DOD policy.<sup>14</sup>



## CHAPTER II

### FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, History of Military-Civilian Substitutability, (October 1965), (hereafter referred to as "History").

2. Ibid., p. 1-2.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 4-5.

5. Ibid., p. 5-6.

6. Ibid., p. 7-8.

7. Ibid., p. 8-9.

8. Ibid., p. 9-10.

9. US War Department, War Department Circular 103, (15 April 1943).

10. US War Department, War Department Circular 248, (15 August 1945).

11. US Congress, Senate, Twenty-Sixth Report, Preparedness Subcommittee, Manpower Utilization at Military Indoctrination Centers, (June 1951).

12. US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 110.4: Guidance for Military Programs, (20 August 1964).

13. History, p. 22-23.

14. Ibid., p. 24-31.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE CIVILIANIZATION PROGRAM PHASE I AND II

##### INTRODUCTION

Allegations are often made that the Army is using military personnel in positions that should be manned by civilians. As a part of the actions being taken in the Modern Volunteer Army program, a concerted effort is being made to preclude the use of soldiers in the performance of tasks which should be normally accomplished by civilians. The Chief of Staff of the Army, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee of Congress on 4 March 1971, stated that a main objective of the Army is to eliminate the use of soldiers in nonmilitary duties.<sup>1</sup> As discussed in the preceeding chapters, civilians have been used in place of military personnel within the Army since the Revolutionary War. A recent and most significant substitution program within the armed services began in 1965.

During the period 1960-1965 there was a gradual decline in the number of civilians employed by the Army from 390,046 to 366,726. Concurrently, the number of military personnel increased.

The following chart shows the changes in personnel strengths from 1960-1965:

TABLE II

ARMY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

YEAR	CIVILIAN	MILITARY
1960	390,046	873,078
1961	390,761	858,622
1962	393,849	1,066,404
1963	375,690	975,916
1964	369,558	973,238
1965	366,726	969,066

The downward trend in Army civilian employment was drastically reversed in 1966 when civilian strength was increased to 455,523.<sup>3</sup> The increase is partially attributable to the build-up of the defense establishment for operations in Vietnam, but, more important, the increase resulted from a directed effort to convert military positions to civilian occupancy.

Background concerning the effort is described by Colonel John J. Betz, action officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of Army, as follows:

The program grew out of a study of the draft laws initiated by the Department of Defense in July 1964. One phase of this study examined the possibility of substituting civilians for military personnel, thereby reducing draft requirements. The problem was given impetus by the President on 1 August 1965, when he directed the Secretary of Defense to review all military functions and if the function did not have to be performed by military personnel that the function be accomplished by other means.

On 11 August 1965, the Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of the Army to comment within 12 days on the possibility of converting 121,000 military

positions to civilian occupancy. Based on a hurried examination of the proposal the Secretary of the Army reported that the Army could convert 25,500 military positions and reduce military support by an additional 5,500 spaces over a two year period.

The Secretary of Defense announced on 16 September 1965 that the armed services would replace 74,300 military personnel with 60,500 civilian personnel in 1966. The program, the Civilianization Program, required each of the services to civilianize a portion of the Defense Department military strength. The Army was to replace 36,500 military personnel with 28,500 civilians provided an equal number of civilian spaces and supporting funds for the conversion were allocated. Further, the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to submit detailed plans and budget requests to his office by 10 November 1965.<sup>4</sup>

#### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CIVILIANIZATION PROGRAM

The serious manpower problems of the Department of Defense were most pronounced in 1964-65. At issue were matters related to existing draft laws. The President directed in April 1964 that a comprehensive study be made of the draft system and related military manpower policies. As a contribution to the overall effort, the Defense Department tasked the military services to examine the possibility of substituting civilians for military personnel, thereby reducing draft requirements.<sup>5</sup>

The study was conducted over a year's period by an ad hoc study group consisting of personnel from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) and military representatives from each of the four armed services.<sup>6</sup>

A variety of data was collected from the services regarding manpower requirements. Included was an expression of the civilian substitution possibilities in the major career specializations. "Military only" positions were identified, which included command and combat positions, positions required for recruiting, positions involved in teaching military subjects, positions providing direct logistical or technical support for combat units, and positions required by law and/or treaty to be occupied by military personnel.<sup>7</sup>

Positions such as Aides de Camp, Inspectors General, and bandsmen were also included as "Military only" positions. The Army placed approximately 69% of all military positions authorized on 30 June 1964 in the "Military only" category, and 2% were isolated as not being under Army control for Substitutability, i.e., positions under control of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Agencies and other government agencies.<sup>8</sup>

For each of the functional areas such as administration, medical, etc., a numerical rating was assigned ranging from one, meaning "highly substitutable," to five denoting "least possible for substitution." Of the 29% identified as being substitutable by the Army the ratings were as follows:<sup>9</sup>

CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE
1	8%
2	7%
3	5%
4	3%
5	6%

In establishing the spectrum of substitutability, each of the services was directed by the Secretary of Defense to adhere to the criteria cited below in determining the degree of substitutability. The following types of positions were considered non-substitutable, and were to be excluded from consideration:

1. All Strategic Retaliatory Forces.
2. Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces (except certain administrative, clerical support personnel).
3. General Purpose Forces (except certain types).
4. Airlift and Sealift Forces, i.e., troop carrier airlift, aeromedical transport, overseas logistical support, special air missions and overseas airlift support services, airlift non-industrial fund overseas, sealift, US tankers, and overseas headquarters and command support.
5. Reserve and Guard Forces, i.e., general support, active duty non-clerical, NROTC and ROTC non-clerical skills, combat skilled headquarters and command support.
6. Research and Development, i.e., combat skills in exploratory development, combat support, limited war laboratories, and extraterritorial testing.
7. General Support (with some exceptions).
8. All Military Assistance overseas.<sup>10</sup>

By establishing such criteria, OSD recognized that functions related to combat and direct combat support were considered exclusive military functions which could be performed by military personnel only.

The completed study reported to the Secretary of Defense that more than 350,000 existing military positions were readily capable

of being filled by civilians. Of the positions identified, 90% were in support activities in the continental United States. The study further noted that replacing 100,000 military personnel with civilians would result in a \$135,000,000 savings per year.<sup>11</sup> Such a saving would result from the elimination of training and processing costs and the replacement ratio of nine civilians to every ten military replaced.

#### THE 1965 PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

The substitution of civilians for military personnel received added emphasis on 1 August 1965 when the President sent the following directive to the Secretary of Defense:

The need for deployment of additional military personnel to Vietnam, for the general augmentation of our active military strength, and for the increased readiness of our Reserve Forces makes it imperative that all military personnel be assigned to duties for which there is a direct military requirement. To this end, I ask that you once again review the functions now being performed by military personnel with a view of eliminating unnecessary functions or where functions are necessary but do not have to be performed by military personnel, accomplishing them in other ways. At this time I want you to be absolutely certain that there is no waste or misapplication of America's manpower in the Department of Defense.<sup>12</sup>

#### COMPLYING WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE

With the President's directive following so closely the completion of the Department of Defense study of the civilianization problem, it is understandable and logical that the study group's efforts

were used as the starting point for complying with the desires of the President. After an 11 August meeting of the Secretary of Defense with the Service Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense requested that each of the services comment within 12 days on the feasibility of converting 312,700 military positions to civilian occupancy, and as a result of these conversions to reduce supporting military strength another 74,000 spaces. The Army's portion of the program amounted to 121,000 positions and a reduction of 22,000 spaces in the support area. Simultaneously the OASD(M) representatives on the study group made available to the military representatives from each of the services a computer printout showing the type of positions that were considered to be convertible to civilian occupancy.

TABLE III

ARMY POSITIONS CONSIDERED CONVERTIBLE BY OSD<sup>13</sup>

TYPE	OCCUPATIONAL AREA	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
OFFICER	Medical/Dental	6,300	33.0
	Engineering & Maintenance	3,600	18.9
	Administration	4,300	22.4
	Supply	3,000	16.0
	All other	<u>1,800</u>	<u>9.7</u>
	Total Officers	19,000	100.0



TABLE III (contd)

TYPE	OCCUPATIONAL AREA	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
ENLISTED	Administration	42,000	42.0
	Services	22,200	21.7
	Medical/Dental	12,700	12.5
	Mechanics	5,000	4.9
	Electronic Repair	7,000	6.8
	Communications & Intelligence	3,300	3.2
	Crafts	2,800	2.8
	All others	<u>6,200</u>	<u>6.1</u>
	Total Enlisted	102,100	100.0

It became apparent immediately that the occupational areas of administration, services, and medical/dental were most susceptible to conversion.

The Service Secretaries were asked to include in their responses an estimate of the "support tail" that would be eliminated as a result of the military positions eliminations. The "support tail" describes the number of positions required to provide support services for military personnel, such as food service, military training, medical services, morale and welfare services, housing support and commissaries. With only 12 days allowed the service secretaries were unable to make an analysis in depth. Later analyses revealed that the support tail ran as high as 36-40 percent of the total force. This was due to the 12 month Vietnam rotation policy, the buildup which caused a disproportionate early increase in the training and support areas, and the decisions not to call-up the desired reserve forces but to support Vietnam from a rotation base that included all long tour areas.

The specific problems confronting the Army were as follows:

1. The Secretary of Defense's proposal was not accompanied by a written study or statement explaining the rationale used by the OSD analysts in arriving at the occupational areas and the numbers of positions considered convertible.

2. The computer printouts furnished by OSD were general and failed to specify locations. Additionally, the occupational areas identified by OSD were not readily convertible to the Army's Military Occupational Speciality Codes.

3. The OSD proposal was based on 30 June 1964 personnel and position data. The Army's strength had in fact increased by 200,000. Deployments, missions and force structure had been changed to meet the rising tempo of operations in Vietnam.

4. Local labor and skill availability had apparently not been considered.

5. The rotation base considered in the OSD proposal included all long tour areas which differs from the Army's view of the rotation base. The Army rotation base included only those military positions in the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii.<sup>14</sup>

The limited analysis performed by the Army on the OSD proposal was based primarily on three studies which had been conducted at three installations in the United States in 1964 to determine which military positions could be converted. Discussions between staff members of the OSD and service staff members disclosed

inconsistencies between the base data and policies on types of positions which must be occupied by military personnel.<sup>15</sup>

The Army forwarded its response to the Secretary of Defense on 23 August 1965. Essentially it stated that:

1. The Army could convert approximately 25,000 positions to civilian occupancy over a two year period.
2. Approximately 5,500 additional military spaces could be eliminated from the supporting elements of the Army as a result of conversion.
3. An assumption was made that local labor conditions would permit recruitment of qualified civilians and that selection of the specific positions to be converted would be based on a detailed field survey.<sup>16</sup>

The other service replies initially indicated that the following number of positions were capable of being converted:<sup>17</sup>

Navy	17,016
Marine Corps	1,476
Air Force	20,000

A period of negotiations between OSD and the services followed the 23 August 1965 submissions, and, on 16 September 1965, the Secretary of Defense established the following goals for each of the services:<sup>18</sup>

TABLE IV

## SUBSTITUTION GOALS

<u>MINUS</u>	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
OFF	1,800	1,575	120	3,000	6,495
EM	<u>34,700</u>	<u>13,425</u>	<u>2,680</u>	<u>17,000</u>	<u>67,805</u>
	36,500	15,000	2,800	20,000	74,300
<u>PLUS</u>					
CIV	28,500	12,500	2,500	17,000	60,500

The President was advised of the Department of Defense Civilianization Plan. The Secretary of Defense directed the services to submit detailed implementation plans to OSD by 10 November 1965. Implementation was to begin on 1 January 1966 and was to be completed by 31 December 1966.<sup>19</sup>

The services were encouraged by the Secretary of Defense to identify additional military positions for subsequent substitution or elimination. A Manpower Utilization Board was established with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) as Chairman and the Services' Under Secretaries as members. The board was to recommend policy and procedural guidance concerning implementation of the program.<sup>20</sup>

PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The deadline of 10 November 1965 established by the Secretary of Defense for each of the Services to submit their detailed plans for conversion caused considerable consternation in the service staffs. Each service developed its plan independently with the

Army and Navy attempting to identify positions to be eliminated from manning documents while the Air Force identified functions where substitutions and eliminations could be made. Additionally, each service used a different approach in estimating costs of the program, but all three services estimated increases were necessary in their respective budgets in order to complete the conversion.

From the outset two major problems confronted Army planners. There was a lack of current information on military positions at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and a minimum period of time remained for detailed planning. In order to save time and to obtain the best data possible, field commanders and selected staff agencies were directed on 18 September 1965 to select the 28,500 positions for conversion from military to civilian occupancy. Each command and staff agency was also assigned a quota for conversion in proportion to its military Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) Authorizations.<sup>21</sup> Nominations by the commanders of positions to be converted were to be submitted to Department of Army prior to 22 October 1965, only 33 calendar days.

Concurrently with the efforts of the field commands, Department of Army conducted two supporting studies. One study surveyed the civilian labor market situation in the United States and it was determined that although the labor market was generally tight, it could support the program. The second study dealt with rotation base requirements for each military skill based on two different tour lengths in the base, 24 months and 36 months.

After the field nominations were received by the Department of Army, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, led a group of six other staff agencies in screening the recommendations. Many positions recommended could not be converted because of deficits in the rotation base. Additional refinement in the rotation policy was necessary to achieve the conversion quota of 28,500 positions. The rotation base criterion was reduced from a three year to a two year CONUS tour versus all overseas tours.<sup>22</sup>

The Army's plan was approved by the Secretary of Army and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 November 1965.

Significant aspects of the plan were:

1. A total of 1,300 officer and 27,200 enlisted positions were to be converted -- 21,398 in the first half and 7,102 in the second half of 1966.
2. The one-time additional cost of the program was estimated to be \$76.76 million through the end of Fiscal Year 1967.
3. A total of 25,277 positions were to be converted in the United States, the remaining 3,223 positions were overseas.
4. The military grades involved corresponded closely to the overall Army grade distributions.
5. Clerical and administrative skills comprised the majority of the skills to be converted.
6. The 8,000 support spaces would be phased out by 30 June 1967.<sup>23</sup>

The Army plan was approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) on 13 December 1965 with two major exceptions. One, the 8,000 support spaces would be eliminated prior to 31 December 1966, and, rather than a budget increase for FY 1967 of \$76.76 million, Secretary of Defense added only \$16.2 million to the Army budget for the Civilianization Program. The budget issue was not resolved until 28 December 1965, which ultimately affected program achievement in 1966. The reason for the reduced amount was that OSD subsequently proved to the Army that civilian personnel were in fact less expensive than military personnel in the same function. For example, considering the pay scales of both civilian and military personnel subsequent to the 1 January 1972 pay raise, the following are used as world-wide cost factors for both categories of personnel:

TABLE V

COMPARATIVE SALARY AND SUPPORT COSTS<sup>24</sup>

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
Average Salary	\$ 10,308	\$ 10,079
Military figure includes; Officer's average salary of \$18,700 at 13.7% of the force and enlisted average salary of \$9,000 at 86.3% of the force; Average number of moves of 1.7 per person per year; and the contribution to retired pay Operations and Maint. Support	2,300	
Cost factor per man, i.e., facilities, logistics, personnel and medical support		
Sub Total	\$ 12,638	\$ 10,079

TABLE V (contd)

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
Support Tail required for each military person, i.e., additional personnel support for activities such as training, mess, recreation and welfare. Currently the support tail is estimated to average 15% of the force structure	<u>1,945</u>	<u>          </u>
Total	\$ 14,583	\$ 10,079

EXECUTING THE PROGRAM

The directive initiating the Civilianization Program was not issued by Department of Army until 19 January 1966.<sup>25</sup> The delay in the implementing instructions was caused by the aforementioned budget issue and the question whether the Army would receive credit for Army positions converted in other Department of Defense components. The DOD approved 12 November 1965 Army Plan was revised by deleting conversions in Puerto Rico and decreasing the conversions in Europe from 2,968 to 2,576.<sup>26</sup> Puerto Rico was deleted from the program because military activities there were to be curtailed in 1966, and any conversions would have had to be eliminated eventually as the positions were abolished. Europe was reduced to lessen the impact of the program on the International Balance of Payments.

Commanders were furnished computer printouts which delineated the specific positions that had been selected for conversion. Since the execution of the program was decentralized, commanders were authorized to substitute other military positions within their



commands provided that the military grade and occupational speciality were not changed. If funds were available, commanders were also authorized to change, positions between budget accounts.<sup>27</sup>

#### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

At the initiation of the program no specific progress reports were required although the 19 January 1966 directive stated that specific instructions concerning reporting program status would be forthcoming. Department of the Army issued reporting instructions on 23 February 1966, which required two reports.<sup>28</sup>

The first was a monthly flash report which was to be transmitted by electrical means to the Department of Army prior to the tenth of each month covering the previous calendar month. Four items were to be reported:

1. The number of enlisted positions converted.
2. The number of officer positions converted.
3. The number of positions under recruitment for 30 days or more with negative results.
4. A synopsis of major problems encountered and/or any recommendations to improve the program.

The second report was to be submitted quarterly within 30 days following the end of the calendar quarter. A punch card was to be submitted on each position showing a complete description of the military and civilianization positions, actual civilian

salary and the disposition of the former military incumbent, e.g., transferred, reported for reassignment, or held pending discharge. The directive also stated that for reporting purposes a position would be considered to have been converted only after the civilian employee had actually reported for duty.

At the time these reporting requirements were established, OSD reporting requirements were still undetermined. It was not until May that OSD established its requirements which called for submission of detailed data on a bimonthly basis. Fortunately, the Army quarterly report contained the data required by OSD, and all the Army did was change the requirement for submission of the quarterly report to a bimonthly basis. However, the format of the OSD report required the Army to revise its computer program to conform to the OSD format. The incident highlights the necessity for establishing feedback requirements prior to initiating a program.<sup>29</sup>

#### PROGRAM PROGRESS

Implementing instructions for each of the services were disseminated as follows:

Navy	OPNAVNOTE 5320, 17 December 1965
Air Force	AFCCS Letter, 30 December 1965
Army	TAG Letter, 18 January 1966

As a result of the delayed start by the Army, a lag developed in the planned conversions that persisted throughout 1966. The

initial directive called for the conversion of 9,889 positions during the first two months of 1966.<sup>30</sup> However, only 353 were converted during the period.<sup>31</sup> Actions were taken in March 1966 by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development to speed up the program by easing the restrictions on conversions.<sup>32</sup>

Due to the concerted efforts of commands and staff agencies, conversions accelerated through the end of the fiscal year. However, on 30 June 1966 only 15,238 of the 21,398 programmed positions had been converted.<sup>33</sup>

The shortfall in the program had serious effects on the Army as assessed by Colonel John Betz, the ACSFOR project officer:

The shortfall of 6,160 positions that existed on 30 June 1966 had a serious impact on the Department of Army. With the end of the fiscal year the authorization for all 21,398 military positions programmed for conversion in the first two calendar quarters were automatically lost to the Army until the positions were filled eventually by civilians.<sup>34</sup>

The other military services also decentralized the implementation of the civilianization program. Quotas were established and progress was monitored by periodic reports from the field. OSD compiled the program data and, as shown on the following chart, the Army progressed statistically well throughout Phase II:

TABLE VI

CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTABILITY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS<sup>35</sup>

SERVICE	PLANNED MILITARY REDUCTIONS	PLANNED CIVILIAN ADDITIONS	%OF NEW CIVILIAN SPACES STAFFED AS OF					
			JUNE 1966	AUG 1966	SEPT 1966	DEC 1966	MAR 1967	JUNE 1967
ARMY	36,500	28,500	61.6	67.6	73.7	94.8	97.5	99.2
NAVY	15,000	12,500	28.8	38.4	62.4	78.6	89.4	94.1
MARINE CORPS	2,800	2,500	47.3	51.2	61.6	98.4	97.6	100.0
AIR FORCE	20,000	17,000	50.0	58.8	70.4	94.8	97.6	99.4
TOTAL	74,300	60,500	51.0	57.0	68.9	90.8	95.7	98.0

The Phase I program did not terminate on 31 December 1966 as originally planned because 1,722 of the programmed positions remained to be converted. However, by 30 June 1967, 28,270 positions had been converted and Phase I of the program was considered completed.<sup>36</sup>

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM

The purpose of the Civilianization Program was, ". . . to eliminate unnecessary functions being performed by military personnel or where functions are necessary but do not have to be performed by military personnel accomplishing them in other ways."<sup>37</sup>

Underlying the basic purpose of the program was better utilization of military personnel and releasing military personnel from nonmilitary functions so that they could be used in Vietnam.

A review of the Army's portion of the program revealed the following data concerning eliminations and conversions:

Of the 28,270 positions converted by the Army during the conduct of Phase I, 14,298 positions, or slightly more than 55% were vacant at the time of conversion.<sup>38</sup> There are several reasons for the positions being vacant at the time of conversion. Partial explanations are:

1. Once a military position was earmarked for conversion, no replacement was assigned when the military incumbent's tour was completed.

2. Additional military positions had been authorized to support the Vietnam build-up, but the positions were not filled at the time the conversions were made.

3. Certain officer positions were authorized, but were above the authorized manning levels.<sup>39</sup>

In the Army's review of the program, reassignment of the remaining 45% of the military incumbents were reportedly as follows:

- 3,439 - Reassigned to another Table of Distribution (TDA) unit.

- 1,388 - Reassigned to a Table of Organizations and Equipment (TOE) unit.

- 1,701 - Reported to higher headquarters for reassignment.

- 4,936 - Other, e.g., short time remaining in service precluding reassignment.<sup>40</sup>

Congressional interest in the accomplishments of the program was evidenced by General Accounting Office (GAO) field visits to several installations. Mr. Walter S. Downs, in his treatment of the subject of the visits, noted specifically:

It (GAO) observed that some military personnel formerly occupying converted positions were not only not assigned to combat units, but remained on the same base. In addition, the group opined that some positions should have been abolished instead of converted because of the nonessentiality of work being performed.

GAO followed up on 6 October 1967 with these tentative findings:

51% of military positions were vacant at the time of conversion.

36% of military personnel whose positions were converted were properly reassigned to military duties.

12% of military personnel whose positions were converted were reassigned to the same military installation in similar positions.

While these findings, per se, were valid, there were factors contributing to them which did not alter program accomplishment.<sup>41</sup>

#### CIVILIANIZATION PROGRAM - PHASE II

As noted previously, Phase I of the program was not considered complete until 30 June 1967, when 99.19% of the conversions had been accomplished. Phase II, a follow-on civilianization program, was being planned and coordinated between OSD and the services while Phase I was still in progress. Based on the results of studies during and preceding Phase I, careful analysis of rotation base requirements and experience gained during the execution of Phase I, the Army staff proposed conversion of 3,927 military TDA positions and elimination of 917 military spaces for a total military reduction during Phase II of 4,844. During the Army staff review of the plans

for Phase II, the Under Secretary of the Army rejected the 4,844 reduction plan as being too conservative. In the continuing dialogue concerning the Civilianization Program, members of the OSD staff had apparently indicated that the Army portion of Phase II should total approximately 15,000 military reductions. The planning for Phase II differed from Phase I significantly as follows:

. . .some degree of flexibility was provided when SECDEF authorized the Army to submit its Phase II program in two categories; soft skill positions in which the civilian labor market was expected to be adequate, and other positions which the Army could plan to convert but for which the current labor market might be inadequate. SECDEF also agreed that any reduction in military spaces could be included in the 15,000 goal. The Army's Phase II plan . . . was submitted as follows:

TABLE VII

ARMY PHASE II PLAN

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>CONVERSIONS</u>	<u>MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A (Adequate Labor Market)	7,094	910	8,004
B (Difficult to Hire)	<u>6,201</u>	<u>795</u>	<u>6,996</u>
	13,295	1,705	15,000

OSD approved the Army's Phase II program on 20 October 1966 for implementation in FY 68. Unlike the Phase I program, early approval provided adequate leadtime to publish implementing instructions thus allowing field commands to accomplish their planning prior to commencing program execution. OSD provided the Army with civilian spaces and funds to support the Category A conversion objective only, but, in the case of Category B provided that reprogramming of funds

and adjustments to military and civilian authorizations would be considered as actual Category B hirings occurred.<sup>42</sup>

The Phase II program conversions commenced on schedule on 1 July 1967 and was scheduled for completion by 31 March 1968. All of the civilian manpower spaces in support of the Category A positions (7,094) were allocated to the commands effective that date. This procedure provided the commands with a reservoir of spaces and permitted hiring beyond monthly program objectives where funding could be absorbed. The progress on the execution of Phase II was excellent during the first four months, but it came to a virtual halt in mid-November 1967. The Army Material Command was projecting funding requirements for the continued support of SEA far in excess of the Army's fund availability. As a part of the actions taken, OSD directed the Army to reduce its civilian spaces in other commands by 3.192% of the Army's total space authorization. This reduced ceiling included civilian spaces which had previously been provided for the civilianization program. Reduction-in-force actions had to be implemented by USCONARC, USASTRATCOM, USASA, TSG, and Cofengrs in order to meet the lowered ceilings. The Army recommended to OSD that the balance of the program (2,107 positions) be terminated as of 30 November 1967, but was overruled. Secretary McNamara stated:

I wish to accord a continued high priority to Phase II civilian-military substitution in order to avoid the use of military personnel in civilian type positions except where justified by rotation and training considerations.



Your reprogramming of civilian-military personnel and funds should, therefore, support the positions identified for substitutions in the same proportion that the total approved civilian employment level can be supported.

Reductions of positions identified for civilian-military substitutions should not be in higher proportion than the reduction in the total civilian employment level.<sup>43</sup>

In effect, this permitted the Army to reduce the Category A conversion objective by 228 positions (7,094 x 3.192%), a very minor savings to the Army.

In theory, the Secretary of Defense's desires to continue the programmed conversion sounded practicable. In actuality, the problems were many. For example: (1) if a command's reduced ceiling was below actual civilian strength, a reduction-in-force was in order; (2) if a command was able to absorb the cut against vacant spaces, the number of civilians separated would be reduced and the monetary savings needed would not materialize; and, (3) if a command's revised ceiling and actual strength were in balance, but since the conversion program had to continue, personnel would have to be released to create vacant positions to accommodate the conversions.

Department of the Army was, in two ways, able to provide some relief to the field commands by changing the conversion rules. First, the completion date was extended from 31 March to 30 June 1968, thus allowing attrition to help with the space problem. Secondly, the new rules allowed an occupied position not previously identified as a part of the conversion program, but in the same TDA and doing a similar task, to be counted against the conversion objective.

The Phase II program was considered complete on 30 June 1968. A total of 6,828 positions were considered converted.<sup>44</sup>

#### EFFECTIVENESS OF AND FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS TO PHASE II

The Army's personnel management system has continued to review and validate positions that should be occupied by civilians. Army Regulation 570-4, dated 10 October 1969, the current manpower guidance document, is explicit in this regard. The Army has been careful to allow "civilianization" only in TDA and not in TOE units.<sup>45</sup> This guidance virtually proves that the MOS mismatch program being experienced today is not an outgrowth of allowing civilians to occupy so many jobs that the CONUS rotation base was destroyed. In reality, a number of decisions had an impact on the MOS matching problem. Examples are the decision to fight the Vietnam war on a one year tour basis; the decision not to mobilize the desired Reserve forces which for the most part were support and service support type units; the mix of forces operating in Vietnam as opposed to the CONUS based forces; and, finally the manpower limitations on the total size of the Army which required all stabilized tour areas to be part of the rotation base and required extensive contractual support efforts. An example of the contractual effort is the aircraft maintenance contract for the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The cost is estimated at \$22.5 million in FY 1972 and the firm employs an average of 2,100 employees. The Army has attempted to stop this effort on two occasions.

since FY 1969, but has been compelled to continue due to either political pressures or being faced with the alternative of sacrificing manning of other units within the military manpower ceilings.<sup>46</sup>

Currently, CONUS based personnel are utilized as the sustaining/rotation base for all overseas manpower requirements. The planning factors for the length of tours are: CONUS - two years; Short Tours - one year; Long Tours - three years. This means that for each man assigned to an overseas area, the Army must retain an additional 2.67 men in the CONUS sustaining base.<sup>47</sup>

Any reduction of the Army's overseas basing requirements will favorably impact on the number of personnel and related skills required in the sustaining base. Any redeployment to CONUS would enhance the Army's capability to civilianize selected jobs, particularly if TDA units are redeployed. The extent of the civilianization capability would depend on the actual troop list and scenario selected; the geographical deployment orientation of the units to the redeployment; the skills involved; and the world-wide grade and skill balance or imbalance that would exist subsequent to the restationing. Although no magic formula exists for determining the extent of civilianization possible, any reduction in overseas basing will enhance this capability.

### CHAPTER III

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## CHAPTER IV

### CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN DEFENSE MANPOWER UTILIZATION

#### CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

Congressional interest in the utilization of military manpower increased considerably when major hearings were held by the Special Subcommittee on Utilization of Military Manpower of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, in 1959 and 1960. The committee was chaired by Congressman Melvin Price of Illinois and included the well-known Army critic, Congressman Frank Kowalski of Connecticut. Major General Van H. Bond, Director of Manpower Management testified:

The Department of Army has worked out, through a mathematical formula, a military rotation percentage. This percentage is 60 percent required of our personnel to be in the continental United States and 40 percent overseas.

In these support areas that we are talking about, with the various skills that are required in the support areas, we have 163,500 overseas. That requires then 246,000 in the continental United States, using our 60-40 formula which incidentally has been proven valid through actual experience.

Now then, to support this 163,500 we actually have only 226,500 in the United States. The difference between what is required and what we have is made up through our new accessions to the Regular Army coming in as well as our drafted people coming in, in order to make up the requirement to support those overseas.

Now, there are certain areas that this committee has shown interest in, namely, the people that we have in our commissaries, the people that we have in our non-appropriated fund activities, and the people that we have on the personal staff.

I can tell you this morning that we have about 2,100 people total in those areas that I have just enumerated. Should we have funds and a higher ceiling, it would be possible to eliminate a larger number of those spaces.<sup>1</sup>

At the time of the hearing, the Army military strength was stabilized with an end strength at the end of FY 59 and programmed for FY 60 of 870,000 and the civilian strength was being reduced from 405,848 to 390,046.<sup>2</sup> The Army had been tasked by Defense to, through manpower surveys, find 500 spaces within their authorized ceiling that could be reallocated to replace military personnel working in the commissaries. In questioning Mr. Gus Lee, OASD (M), the committee stated:

MR. SLATINSHEK: Mr. Chairman, I believe the committee recognizes as valid everything you said, Mr. Lee. However, they are concerned with this further aspect of the problem. You mentioned that the services were directed in the case of the Army, to search your available civilian spaces; cut out 500; make them available to the commissary to take care of this commissary problem.

But aren't you just shoving the problem under the rug? Isn't this actually a numbers game, you see? Actually, if the other spaces were valid to begin with, you had a requirement and mission to perform; someone necessarily, if that mission continues, will have to perform it.

The committee is concerned with the possibility of your putting military people in these other jobs, possibly a support function of one kind or another.

In connection with this case, I quote the language in the report. The Army says: '...insufficient funds with which to support high priority missions, Fort Lewis felt it necessary to use military personnel in the performance of installation functions.'

That is the very heart of the problem.



MR. SLATINSHEK: (reading) "Reduction in force affecting six employees has been ordered at US Naval Security Station registered publication section Nebraska Avenue NW effective 26 February 1960. Official notices state 'abolishment of position because of insufficient funds with which to operate the station at its present level of civilian employment. Five enlisted men replacing civilian employees. Therefore, jobs are not being abolished. One GS-9 position vacant for several years filled recently by retired chief.' And it goes along that line.<sup>3</sup>

MR. PRICE: How much will this be affected? It certainly increases the problem and adds to the difficulty in abolishing what we originally set out to do.

MR. LEE: Well, we have come down over the years in both military manpower and in civilian manpower, as you know. We have come down percentagewise more in military than we have in civilian.

Now, nothing stays constant, so this doesn't prove any arguments. In recent years, as available civilian manpower got tighter, it became more difficult at each local activity to be sure that you had the thing in proper balance, and we have indeed made the Defense Department's policies a little more flexible in the sense that we say, use your resources efficiently to get a given job done at a local installation.

At the same time we say our general policy is to use civilians as much as possible, and in the 2 percent reduction which is now being put into effect for Defense overall, the instructions that went out to the military departments were to achieve this reduction of civilians without substituting contract services, without using military personnel in lieu of them.

Now I will admit that is a statement of intention, and can be very, very difficult to do at a local level because the thing is never going to be administered perfectly, and the judgment you make is never going to cover perfectly every instance.

But it would be my opinion that these instances of notice that you have, where somebody has alleged that a military has replaced a civilian, are not a fairly universal sample of the whole thing because if there is even a smattering of suspicion that this is

happening, it has been our experience in the past that it has always been called to our attention and we look into it and if indeed it hasn't been a proper case, appropriate action has been taken.

MR. COHELAN: Mr. Chairman.

MR. PRICE: Mr. Cohelan.

MR. COHELAN: Mr. Lee, isn't this case, this very thing that came in this morning, doesn't it raise all kinds of questions, or isn't it fair, I should say, that we would conclude or at least infer that maybe you have got more military manpower than you need if all of a sudden spaces are eliminated in the civilian area and quick like a bunny you grab yourself five guys and can put them in just like nothing? I get all cranked up at this point.

MR. KOWALSKI: Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss with Mr. Lee, and I would like to have his comments on policy regarding KP's. It was brought to my attention in Europe, for example, that the Army has to use its own enlisted men as KP's; so does the Navy but the Air Force does not.

When I asked the Air Force commander why they were using civilians, he said it was obvious that it would cost us \$10,000 to \$12,000 to bring an enlisted man over to Europe to have him work as a KP, and at various large messes they use as many as 100 civilians.<sup>4</sup>

These detailed and penetrating type questions have continued to be the hallmark of Congressional Hearings. The hearings definitely established that use of military personnel in nonmilitary tasks could be an ineffective and inefficient use of personnel due to less job stabilization, training costs, and frequent rotation costs.

#### GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS

The General Accounting Office, acting on the request from the subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service examined the 1965-66 Civilianization

Program at Forts Belvoir, Benning and Carson. The report was issued on 26 January 1968 entitled, "Accomplishments Under Phase I of the Civilianization Program." The reports alleged that the program did not result in the release of as many military personnel as had been planned because many positions were vacant, that many of the military were not reassigned to duties which required military personnel, that no directive was issued to revalidate requirements, and that insufficient emphasis was placed on the conversion of higher grades.<sup>5</sup> During an FY 1969 House Appropriations Committee hearing on the Military Personnel, Army, Appropriation, 6 May 1968, the GAO report was cited and a committee member stated, "From these disclosures, it would appear that the major objective of the civilianization program is not being realized - either because it was improperly implemented, is being mismanaged, or there is a complete lack of understanding of the basic purpose of the program."<sup>6</sup>

#### REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL ACT - 1968

Due to the GAO report, the apparent distrust of the Army's personnel management capabilities, and a directed Defense expenditure reduction, Public Law 90-364 entitled, "Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968" was enacted effective 1 July 1968. With the exception of Presidential appointments, casual employees or employees serving without compensation, and the President's program to provide summer employment for economically or educationally disadvantaged persons between the ages of 16 and 22 (not to exceed 70,000 during any month), the act stated:

1. No person shall be appointed as a full-time civilian employee to a permanent position in the executive branch during any month when the number of such employees is greater than the number of such employees on 30 June 1966.

2. The number of temporary and part-time employees in any department or agency in the executive branch in any month shall not be greater than the number of such employees during the corresponding month of 1977.

### THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF CONGRESS

The Civilianization Program had added approximately 20,000 civilian positions to the Army ceiling from that which existed on 30 June 1966. Army and OSD both appealed to the Congress for a special exemption to the act for those spaces converted from military to civilian occupancy during both Phase I and II programs. Congress refused the request which, in effect, meant that the Army had over a two year period lost a combined total of approximately 40,000 military and civilian spaces by implementing the Civilianization Program.

It becomes apparent that Congress explicitly understands the purpose of any civilianization program. Yet, their desire to keep a bureaucratic organization such as the Defense Department at what they consider to be manageable and understandable levels of employment is uppermost in their minds. This desire and strong sense of responsibility is such that across the board manpower changes, such as PL 90-364, are real probabilities in any given fiscal year. The writers believe this attitude and penetrating type of hearings on

manpower management will continue through the 1970's. The following quoted report from the House Appropriations Committee on the Department of Defense Appropriations Committee on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 1972 is strong evidence supporting this belief.

The Committee reviewed in depth the promotion practices and the officer grade structure of the Armed Services. The review revealed that there are more three and four star generals and admirals in uniform today than there were at the height of World War II when there were over 12 million men and women in uniform. Even more startling is a comparison of the number of individuals serving in the grades of Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel and Navy Captain or Commander. Today there are 900,000 fewer officers in uniform than there were in 1945 but we have 6,000 more Colonels, Navy Captains and Commanders.

An equally interesting comparison can be drawn by comparing our peak officer strength during the Korean War with our officer strength today. At the peak of the Korean War we had 3.6 million men in uniform and today we have only 2.7 million. However, we have 190 more Generals and Admirals today than we had at the height of the Korean War. Even more amazing is the fact that today we have over 16,000 more Colonels and Navy Captains and Commanders than when we had a million more men in uniform. The above strength figures are clearly illustrated in the following table:

TABLE VIII

## OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE

RANK	WW II 30 JUN 45	KOREA 30 JUN 52	TODAY 30 JUN 71
General or Admiral	38	25	45
Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral	101	65	145
Major and Brigadier General or Rear Admiral	<u>1,929</u>	<u>1,052</u>	<u>1,145</u>
Subtotal	2,068	1,142	1,330
Colonel or Captain	14,989	12,490	17,388
Lieutenant Colonel or Commander	<u>36,967</u>	<u>28,927</u>	<u>40,431</u>
Subtotal	51,956	41,417	57,819
Total Officers	1,260,109	375,829	371,416
Total Enlisted	<u>10,795,775</u>	<u>3,245,310</u>	<u>2,329,754</u>
Total	12,123,455	3,635,912	2,714,722

The Committee feels that much of this proliferation of high ranking officers results from the assigning of military men to traditionally civilian jobs. Every few years the Department of Defense announces a civilianization program, the intention of which is to reduce the number of military personnel assigned to civilian type jobs. However, what has evidently happened over the years is a rather rapid and drastic Civilianization in reverse or Militarization of many of the higher level civilian jobs in the Department of Defense. A case in point is the Defense Supply Agency, which is authorized 21 general officers. In addition, hearings with DSA revealed that while DSA's employment will have dropped by 5,355 during the last two years, the organization will have added 127 more colonels and above during the same period. A further case can be made that DSA does not require any general officers. This continual upgrading of personnel apparently is happening throughout the Defense Department.

The need to let civilians do civilian jobs in the Department of Defense becomes increasingly important as the cost of military personnel continues to increase. Not only do some high ranking officers cost more in terms of salary and benefits than their civilian counterparts but there is the added cost of first having to train them for a new job and then having to move them to another new assignment after two or three years.

Because of this obvious proliferation of high ranking officers the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to review the officer requirements of each of the Services. The result of this review are to be presented to the Committee as a part of the hearing on the fiscal year 1973 budget estimates.<sup>8</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### FOOTNOTES

1. US Congress, House, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Utilization of Military Manpower, Utilization of Military Manpower, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, (1960), p. 5699 (hereafter referred to as "Utilization of Manpower").
2. US Department of Army, Office of the Comptroller of the Army, Pocket Data Book Supplement, 1968, (February 1969), p. 8.
3. Utilization of Manpower, p. 5621.
4. Ibid., p. 5623.
5. US Congress, General Accounting Office, Accomplishments Under Phase I of the Civilianization Program, (26 January 1968).
6. US Congress, House, Hearings on Military Personnel Army Appropriation, FY 1969, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, (1968).
7. US Congress, House, Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, (28 June 1968).
8. US Congress, House, Report on Department of Defense Appropriation Bill for FY 1972, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, (1971).



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

#### STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the history of the US Army, civilians have played an important and sometimes critical role in the tasks performed by the Army. Whether it was a deliberate, planned and executed program or a crash program to support the immediate needs of the Army in times of mobilization or expansion, civilians have performed support/service type functions in times of war and peace. Policies have been developed over nearly 200 years by the Armed Forces, by the President, and by Congress -- all pointing to one principle: military personnel are to be assigned to duties requiring military training, discipline and performance. The problems of discipline, control and law have basically ruled-out any general policy of assigning civilians to combat functions.

The fiscal realities of the nonflexible programs in the Federal Budget such as health and income security demand that responsible authorities such as the civilian hierarchy in the Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget and the Congress explore every possible means of accomplishing all the required tasks in the most economical yet effective manner. This reality means that those in authority will continue to conduct detailed investigations of the Department of Defense's manpower management practices. Granted, the US Army is subjected to periodic across-the-board manpower reductions

by Congress as opposed to a thorough review of the requirements. These type reductions have and may occur again in both the military and civilian personnel programs. However, Congress has imposed these reductions only when convinced the Army's manpower management practices were less effective than desired; e.g., the GAO report on the accomplishments of the 1965-68 Civilianization Program and the resulting Revenue and Expenditure Act of 1968.

The US Army determines its force structure under two basic constraints, fiscal and military manpower. These constraints present many dilemmas to the decisionmakers which are ultimately reduced to how many personnel services versus how many things are going to be purchased. For each military person placed in a non-military function, the Army sacrifices on a one-to-one ratio the manning of its desired force structure. If one assumes that the present manpower constraints can be overcome by greater justification of force requirements, i.e., deployments and the threat, the fiscal restraint of operating the increased force structure on the minimum resources required remains a reality. Any effort by the Army to utilize military personnel on-board to meet contingency operations stands a good chance of being denied due to Congressional interest and fiscal constraints. It has been proven that civilian manpower costs, per job function, are considerably less than the costs of accomplishing the same job with military personnel. Other than costs, the use of civilian personnel in the total military force organization offers several advantages. Many jobs can be performed by civilians, as well as, or better than, military personnel. Normally, civilians are recruited from among

those already possessing the skills needed for the job and the best qualified individual is selected. Training requirements for certain technical skills are reduced or eliminated. There are benefits to the government by not having to provide base operations services, e.g., housing, medical, messing and special services associated with the maintaining of military personnel.

In an attempt to overcome some of the problems outlined above, the Army has structured its Reserve Forces to meet the combat theater personnel needs in the support/service support functions that will continue to be accomplished in CONUS by civilians. A political decision that denies the Army the services of these forces in times of emergencies places the Army in the very undesirable position of having to train new accessions and readjust its rotation base structure. This unknown of who and what will be mobilized in an emergency appears to be a problem that will remain with the Army throughout the 1970's. It certainly highlights the Army's responsibility to prove to the civilian hierarchy in the Department of Defense and to the Congress all of the reasons for the one-Army concept and just how large a build-up or contingency the Army is able to cope with without the services of the Reserve Forces.

Any reduction in the overseas basing requirements will favorably impact on the CONUS sustaining base requirements and provide an opportunity to civilianize more positions. The extent of the civilianization capability can be determined only after the unit/troop list selected for redeployment is developed.

Throughout the readings of the many pages of recorded Congressional Testimony, the writers believe one shortcoming becomes apparent. The hearings are conducted by the Armed Services Committees on total programs but are then approached in a somewhat fragmented, finite appropriation structured method by the committees. It is not evident that the total manpower program is justified to the appropriation committees in a manner that proves where a military versus a civilian person is required and why. The appropriation committees have a tendency to look at the changes in money requirements from year to year without looking at the total mix of military and civilian personnel required. This is a problem that the Army staff is aware of and actively involved in preparing a program that proves the "teeth to tail" ratio. The Congressional requirement for the services to present senior official grade distribution and assignments during the FY 1973 House appropriation hearings appears to be a proper time to prove the Army's requirements and personnel management expertise.

The concluding philosophical thought concerns any particular individual's reaction to the program. It may well reflect subjective viewpoints depending upon one's experience in work situations combining military and civilian personnel. The writers believe that the philosophy of the "team concept" provides a realistic outlook for the individual. He is encouraged to make his contribution to mission accomplishment; his worth and potential are recognized as an individual, not as military or civilian, but as a "team member."


### SUMMARY

1. The writers believe the Army should continue to identify positions that can be occupied by civilians and employ civilians in those positions where possible. Should the Army reduce the number of personnel based overseas in the 1970's, an opportunity will exist to civilianize certain positions. The Army should take advantage of the opportunity to civilianize in light of the monetary savings and the opportunity to improve the "teeth to tail" ratio.

2. In times of mobilization with reserve callups, the Army must plan to expand the civilian work force and to expand military service support training in the sustaining base for eventual deployment.

3. The element of proof is on the Army to prove manpower requirements both military and civilian.

  
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LTC Inf

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